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This study investigates the increase in forecasting accuracy of hazard rate bankruptcy 
prediction models with creditor coordination effects over the forecasting period 1990-
2009. A firm’s probability of bankruptcy is likely to be marginally affected by 
creditors’ coordination behavior, since failure to coordinate may result in premature 
foreclosure, denial of refinancing, or disagreement over private restructuring. Applying 
findings from prior literature, I present creditor coordination effects as interactions 
between the ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination failure and a firm’s information 
characteristics. The most striking finding of this study is an increase, on average, of 
10% in the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of private firm prediction models with 
creditor coordination effects. The contributions of this study are twofold, (1) the hazard 
rate model results provide evidence that creditor coordination can exert marginal effects 
on firms’ probability of bankruptcy, and (2) the forecast accuracy results suggest that 
incorporating creditor coordination effects can significantly improve the forecasting 
accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models for private firms. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
 With the unprecedented expansion of credit markets
1
 and surging number of 
defaults and bankruptcies
2
 over the past decade
3
, the economic significance of 
bankruptcy hazard rate estimation has steadily increased. In particular, as private firms 
have become dominant players in the U.S. credit universe in recent years (Witman and 
Diz, 2009), estimating the probability of bankruptcy
4
 in the absence of equity market 
price information has become a particular challenge for investors and academics. 
 To assess the probability of bankruptcy more accurately in the absence of equity 
market price information, a prediction model must be able to capture, from financial 
statements and other publicly available sources, a comprehensive set of information 
regarding bankruptcy risk of the firm. However, as Beaver, Correia, and McNichols 
(2010) note, extant private firm models
5
 for predicting financial distress or bankruptcy 
based on financial ratios are limited to financial statement information, which 
constitutes only part of the total mix of available information. The purpose of this study 
                                                 
1
 According to Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), during the past decade, 
the total amount of outstanding debt in U.S. corporate bond market has more than doubled, from $3.4 
billion in 2000 to $6.9 billion in 2009. As a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), corporate 
debt increased from 33.7% in 2000 to 48.7% in 2009 (Bureau of Economic Analysis; SIFMA). 
 
2
 Bankruptcy in this study refers to Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings. 
 
3
 Himmelberg, et al. (2010) document that bond default rate has been the highest in the most recent 
recession compared to previous recessions. Table 2 in this paper also provides evidence on this trend. 
 
4
 This study focuses on bankruptcy prediction instead of financial distress or default prediction. Since 
creditor coordination effects are likely to be most crucial when we analyze their role in bankruptcy due to 
their central role in the out-of-court restructuring, the implications of creditor coordination effects are 
most comprehensive in predicting bankruptcy. However, the tenor of the results remains unchanged 
when I expand the sample to financially distressed firms, or restrict the sample to defaults. 
 
5
 Private (public) firm bankruptcy prediction model refers to models that predict bankruptcy without 
(with) equity market information, using accounting-based or information-based variables. While private 
firm models can be used for prediction of both private and public equity firm bankruptcies, they are the 
best available models for private equity firms, since public firm models can be only used for public 





is to expand the pool of information relevant to estimating the probability of bankruptcy 
by shifting attention to the unique role of creditor coordination in the firm’s path to 
financial distress and bankruptcy.  
This study investigates how incorporating creditor coordination effects increases the 
forecasting accuracy of hazard rate bankruptcy prediction models. In this study, creditor 
coordination effects are defined as the effects creditors’ coordination failure can have 
on the likelihood of a firm filing for bankruptcy. Prior research and anecdotal evidence 
on financial distress and creditor coordination suggest that the probability of default or 
bankruptcy depends not only on where the firm stands in terms of current accounting 
fundamentals, but also on the likelihood of creditors’ coordination failure6. Creditors 
that normally play a passive role in the firm’s operations can become highly influential 
in the firm’s destiny at crucial decision-making points such as lending (Morris and Shin, 
2004), refinancing (Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini, 2010) or private restructuring 
(Brunner and Krahnen, 2009). Creditors’ decisions to foreclose on loans, deny 
refinancing, or disagree on private restructuring terms, can increase the likelihood of 
financial distress and bankruptcy for a firm.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that creditor coordination is a manifestation of a 
combination of complicated strategic decisions that reflect diverse interests. From the 
complex creditor coordination games that play out in the real world, the theoretical 
literature on creditor coordination has extracted core dimensions of coordination among 
creditors from which rigorous frameworks for analyzing creditor coordination behavior 
                                                 
6
 Morris and Shin (2004) analyze the ex ante risk of creditor coordination failure, which should be 
marginally priced in debt securities. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) provide evidence on distressed firms’ 
failure of coordination among creditors, and how this increases the likelihood that the firm fails to reach 





have been devised. The present study employs theoretical frameworks from prior 
literature on creditor coordination to analyze creditor coordination behavior in terms of 
the interaction between specific variables, namely, the ex ante likelihood of creditor 
coordination failure and a firm’s information characteristics. 
Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a firm’s ex ante likelihood of 
coordination failure is determined first and foremost by various aspects of a firm’s 
capital structure. The composition and strategic positions of creditors and maturity 
structure of debt have been identified as major aspects of capital structure that 
constitute potential creditor coordination problems. For instance, the greater the number 
of creditors, the more diverse their interests, or if the firm has public debt-holders, prior 
studies document the greater the ex ante likelihood of coordination failure, ceteris 
paribus (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996). 
Furthermore, prior research suggests that creditor coordination problems are 
affected by firms’ information characteristics. Three characteristics of firm-specific 
information have been identified by prior research as most relevant to the decisions of 
creditors in the strategic setting of the creditor coordination game: (1) ex ante credit 
quality of the firm (2) uncertainty on the firm’s future fundamentals, and (3) public 
exposure of firm-specific information
7
. 
Prior studies suggest that a firm’s ex ante likelihood of coordination failure is 
influenced by ex ante credit quality of the firm. Morris and Shin (2004), Brunner and 
Krahnen (2008), and Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010) note that conditional on 
                                                 
7
 Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010), Anctil et al. (2004), and Walther (2004) studies the role 
information transparency plays in creditor coordination game. This study draws implications from these 
studies on how public exposure of firm-specific information can affect creditor coordination, as 
measured by creditor transparency index (CTI), which is based on how the firm’s information is exposed 





the firm’s capital structure, firms with lower credit quality are likely to have more sever 
creditor coordination problems. This is due to the fact that when the credit quality of 
the firm is lower, strategic uncertainty on actions of other creditors tends to increase. 
Prior studies also suggest that creditor coordination problems are likely to be 
exacerbated when there is higher uncertainty on future fundamentals of the firm, which 
impose higher information uncertainty among creditors (Morris and Shin, 2004). Public 
exposure of firm-specific information, on the other hand, has been shown to have an 
ambiguous effect on creditor coordination. Greater exposure of firm-specific 
information to creditors can exacerbate or ameliorate creditors’ coordination depending 
on whether it generates higher strategic uncertainty among creditors (Morris and Shin, 
2004) or serves as an anchor in private restructuring negotiations
8
.  
Applying findings from prior literature to the hazard rate prediction model, I present 
creditor coordination effects as interactions between two set of factors, (1) the ex ante 
likelihood of creditor coordination failure measured in terms of the firm’s capital 
structure variables (2) the firm’s information characteristics, specifically, the firm’s ex 
ante credit quality, uncertainty on future fundamentals of the firm as measured by the 
negative accruals, and degree of public exposure of firm-specific information to 
creditors, as measured by a creditor transparency index (CTI). 
If creditor coordination effects provide information regarding the firm’s probability 
of bankruptcy over and above what is suggested by current accounting fundamentals 
(i.e., financial ratios), coefficients of hazard rate model should be consistent with 
theoretical predictions, and incorporating these effects into hazard rate bankruptcy 
                                                 
8
 Detragiache (1994) notes that market price acts as a reference point for setting terms of distressed 






prediction models should improve the accuracy of their predictions regarding the 
probability of bankruptcy. 
I employ hazard rate models following Shumway (2001), Beaver, McNichols, and 
Rhie (2005), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), and Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) to estimate the ex ante probability of bankruptcy with creditor coordination 
effects. As Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
document, simple hazard rate models using a multivariate logit framework have higher 
out-of-sample forecasting accuracy than other methodologies for estimating the 
probability of financial distress or bankruptcy. 
Consequently, I use the hazard rate methodology adopted by Shumway (2001), and 
the models with sets of variables from Altman (1965), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski 
(1984), and Bharath and Shumway (2008), as my basic private and public firm models. 
After fitting the models and calculating scores for each firm-year, I rank the scores and 
compare them with actual occurrences of bankruptcies to measure forecasting accuracy 
at different cut-off points for binomial outcomes. 
When I fit the hazard rate model with creditor coordination effects, I find the 
coefficients to be statistically significant and signs to be consistent with predictions 
from prior research. Firms with higher ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination 
failure, more negative accruals, higher earnings volatility, higher analyst forecast 
dispersion and more public exposure in the eyes of creditors are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy than otherwise similar firms. In analyzing the interaction terms, I further 
find that firms with higher ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination failure are, if their 





higher, significantly more likely to file for bankruptcy than firms with a similar ex ante 
likelihood of creditor coordination failure. For firms with greater public exposure of 
firm-specific information as measured by the creditor transparency index, the results 
vary with the different types of ex ante creditor coordination variables, consistent with 
analytical predictions from prior research. 
Using coefficients from hazard rate bankruptcy prediction models to calculate 
forecasting accuracy based on actual observations of hand-collected bankruptcy filings, 
I find the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the bankruptcy prediction models 
measured by the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (―ROC 
curve‖) to be higher by, on average, 10% across 20 years of rolling forecast period, 
when creditor coordination effects are incorporated into private firm models. The 
finding on private firm models is striking with regards to its magnitude of increase in 
forecasting accuracy
9
, which is clearly economically significant. For public firm 
models, increase in forecast accuracy is consistently 1-2%, which is statistically 
significant but economically less meaningful compared to private firm models. The 
finding on public firm models is consistent with information contained in creditor 
coordination effects mostly, but not wholly, impounded into public equity prices. 
I find these results consistently for different specifications of the hazard rate 
bankruptcy prediction models, which suggests that creditor coordination effects provide 
additional predictive power over and above the comprehensive sets of financial ratios, 
and even equity-market-based variables studied in prior research. My results are also 
consistent with creditor coordination effects not being subsumed by information on 






current accounting fundamentals or equity market prices, but rather providing a distinct 
set of information on the probability of bankruptcy. 
To check the robustness of the finding, I perform various tests to investigate the 
endogeneity issues related to creditor coordination variables and their interactions with 
information characteristics variables. I also perform predictions based on more detailed 
components of accruals to explore which components are most relevant to creditor 
coordination effects.  
Results from these additional tests on endogeneity generally corroborate 
interpretation of my results as effects of creditor coordination on the probability of 
bankruptcy, and are inconsistent with alternative explanations for the finding, such as 
the endogeniety of capital structure variables, agency problem arising from information 
asymmetry, market risk premium or other predictors of financial distress associated 
with creditor coordination effects. 
This study makes several contributions. First, it predicts bankruptcy from the novel 
perspective of incorporating the role of creditor coordination in the path to financial 
distress that ultimately leads to bankruptcy. By incorporating creditor coordination 
effects derived from theory, this study adopts a broader set of variables that contain 
information about distress and bankruptcy risk, specifically, the risk that creditors will 
fail to coordinate based on firm-specific information characteristics. This study thus 
extends the set of information that can be used to assess distress or bankruptcy risk 
based on a rigorous analytical framework, and suggests that creditor coordination 
effects provide information on the probability of bankruptcy beyond what can be 





Second, the study provides evidence that incorporating creditor coordination effects 
into private firm bankruptcy prediction models substantially improves the accuracy of 
bankruptcy prediction. The degree to which forecasting accuracy is improved, for both 
private firm model (10%) and public firm model (1-2%) is especially striking given that 
the area under the ROC curve is one of the most rigorous measures of forecasting 
accuracy for binomial outcomes. Evidence from prior studies suggests that it is 
extremely difficult to consistently increase the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of 
hazard rate prediction models by including additional variables. Chava and Jarrow 
(2004), for example, cite as one of the major contributions of their study their 
documentation of only a 1-2% improvement in out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, as 
measured by the area under the ROC curve, when industry effects are incorporated. 
By incorporating variables that capture the role of creditors as active decision-
makers in firms’ destinies, this study demonstrates that the more comprehensive set of 
information as a result of incorporating creditor coordination effects is able to improve 
the forecasting accuracy of default or bankruptcy prediction, especially for private firm 
models. Therefore, this study can be most useful to academics, managers, investors, and 
others to predict private firm bankruptcies more accurately by incorporating creditor 
coordination variables into prediction models. 
Lastly, this study provides evidence on the role of uncertainty on future 
fundamentals of the firm as measured by analyst forecast dispersion, and negative 
accruals in influencing creditors’ decisions to coordinate, and thereby the probability of 
bankruptcy. Although prior bankruptcy prediction research has considered information 





equity market price (Shumway, 2001), the effect of analyst forecast dispersion, and 
negative accruals on creditors’ coordination decisions has previously not been taken 
into account in distress or bankruptcy prediction. By providing evidence on the role of 
analyst forecast dispersion, and negative accruals in creditor coordination leading to 
bankruptcy outcomes, this study adds to our understanding of creditors’ use of analyst 
forecasts and accounting information, and how information on firms’ future 
fundamentals may affect coordination among creditors
10
. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a 
literature review and formulate hypotheses. In section 3, I present the hazard rate model 
and variables I use to measure creditor coordination effects. In section 4, I explain my 
sample selection and provide sample characteristics. Empirical results are presented in 
section 5, and I conduct robustness tests in Section 6. I summarize and conclude in 
section 7. 
 
Section 2: Literature review and hypotheses development 
I investigate the increase in forecasting accuracy of hazard rate bankruptcy 
prediction models by incorporating creditor coordination effects. Notably, the role of 
creditor coordination in determining optimal credit, default, and bankruptcy has been 
extensively studied in theoretical research (Diamond and Dvybvig, 1983; Bruche, 2010; 
Morris and Shin, 2004; Bris and Welch, 2005; Anctil et al, 2010), as well as in 
experimental research (Anctil et al. 2004; Cornand and Heinemann, 2010).  
                                                 
10
 Penman (2007) suggests that fundamental analyses can help creditors to analyze default and 
bankruptcy risk of the firm more effectively. Relatedly, understanding how creditors coordinate based on 





Creditor coordination has been studied in relations to the choice of capital structure 
(Bolton and Sharfstein, 1996; Bris and Welch, 2005), reorganization law (Gertner and 
Scharfstein, 1991; Mooradian, 1994), and debt pricing (Morris and Shin, 2004; Bruche, 
2010), among many other topics. Relatedly, Walther (2004) notes that empirical work 
identifying costs and benefits of improved transparency in creditor setting is crucial in 
complementing theoretical and experimental works on creditor coordination. 
In comparison to extensive analytical research on creditor coordination problems, 
empirical research documenting coordination failure remains limited. Gilson, John and 
Lang (1990) show that in their sample of distressed firms, firms that avoid bankruptcy 
and privately restructure the debt are more likely to have bank debt, since it is more 
likely that banks are able to ameliorate the problem of coordination failure by actively 
engaging in a private restructuring agreement amongst debt-holders. On the other hand, 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) provide evidence that one of the most 
important determinants of disagreement among creditors in private restructuring is the 
existence of public debt-holders
11
. They find that having public debt dominates other 
possible determinants such as having bank debt as Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) 
suggest. More recently, Brunner and Krahnen (2009) empirically examine coordination 
problem of multiple creditors for German firms and find that ―bank pool‖ serves as a 
mechanism to ameliorate coordination problem among creditors. 
Prior research on creditor coordination suggest that firms with higher likelihood of 
coordination failure in lending, refinancing, or private restructuring as characterized by 
having public debt outstanding (Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994) with higher 
                                                 
11
 Bolton and Scharstein (1996) point out that due to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, unanimous 
consents among debt-holders are required to change major terms of public debt contracts, making public 





number of debt-holders (Morris and Shin, 2004), with higher proportion of short-term 
debt (Morris and Shin, 2004), lower proportion of bank debt (Gilson, John, and Lang, 
1990), and lower credit quality (Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini, 2010) are more 
likely to file for bankruptcy than otherwise similar firms. 
Moreover, theoretical research on creditor coordination predicts that depending on 
the firm’s information characteristics, for the same level of ex ante likelihood of 
coordination failure, the probability of bankruptcy would increase further, suggesting 
interaction effects between ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination and the firm’s 
information characteristics. Morris and Shin (2004) show that firms with higher 
likelihood of ex ante creditor coordination failure, with lower ex ante credit quality or 
higher uncertainty on future fundamentals, are less likely to coordinate in lending. 
Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010) show that for firms with more publicly 
available information on their credit quality, creditors are less willing to coordinate by 
lending less or refusing to provide additional financing compared to firms with similar 
ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination. On the other hand, Anctil et al. (2004) show 
that the effect of transparency on creditors’ coordination behavior depends on the 
assumptions imposed. 
In sum, both theoretical and empirical findings suggest that firms with higher ex 
ante likelihood of coordination failure are more likely to file for bankruptcy ceteris 
paribus, and the firm’s information characteristics can influence creditor coordination 
problems. Based on prior research, I present creditor coordination effects as interactions 
between two set of factors, (1) the ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination failure 





characteristics relevant to creditor coordination, specifically, information that affects 
creditors’ belief on the firm’s future fundamentals as measured by the ex ante credit 
quality, analyst forecast dispersion, negative accruals, and degree of public exposure of 
firm-specific information to creditors, as measured by a creditor transparency index. 
If variables representing creditor coordination effects adequately capture their 
relationships with the probability of financial distress or bankruptcy, I would expect to 
find coefficients of creditor coordination effects estimated by hazard rate models to be 
statistically significant, with signs of the coefficients consistent with predictions from 
prior research on creditor coordination. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
 
H1: Coefficients of creditor coordination effects from hazard rate model estimations 
are significant and consistent with predictions from analytical frameworks of 
creditor coordination problems. 
 
 
Furthermore, if creditor coordination effects provide information regarding the 
probability of bankruptcy over and above what is suggested by current accounting 
fundamentals (i.e., financial ratios), then incorporating these effects into hazard rate 
bankruptcy prediction models should improve the accuracy of their predictions 
regarding the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:  
 
H2: By incorporating creditor coordination effects, both in-sample fit and out-of 
sample forecasting accuracies of hazard rate bankruptcy prediction models are 
increased significantly. 
 
Section 3: Research Design 





In order to investigate the increase in forecasting accuracy of bankruptcy prediction 
models by including creditor coordination effects, I employ the reduced-form 
econometric hazard rate model first adopted by Shumway (2001) and employed by 
Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) to measure the ex ante probability of default and/or 
bankruptcy for private firms. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) find that hazard rate models outperform models 
based on Merton (1974)’s structural framework in terms of both in-sample-fit and out-
of-sample forecasting accuracy when variables of structural model are included in the 
hazard rate model as explanatory variables. Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) also note 
superior performance of Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005) as a benchmark to 
compare with their hybrid corporate default prediction model. Moreover, hazard rate 
models can be most flexible in incorporating new set of variables without restrictions 
on specific functional forms or using equity market price information. Therefore, I use 
hazard rate models in my tests of forecasting accuracy. 
As for the selection of variables, I employ four models with different sets of 
variables from Altman (1965), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), Shumway (2001), 
and Bharath and Shumway (2008)
12
. These four models incorporate accounting-based 
variables that have been shown to contain a comprehensive set of information from 
                                                 
12
 Altman (1965) uses discriminant analysis, whereas Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984) use simple 
logit models. However, as Shumway (2001) and Chava and Shumway (2004) demonstrate, hazard rate 
prediction models with variables from Altman (1965), Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984) outperform 
original models in terms of both in- and out-of-sample forecasting accuracies. Hence, this study 
uniformly uses hazard rate models with variables from Altman (1965), Ohlson (1980), and Zmijewski 





financial statements on the probability of bankruptcy. The general form of the hazard 
model I employ is based on the following statistical relationship: 
Log[hj(t) / (1-hj(t))] = α(t) + BXj(t)                                                                         (1) 
In this model, hj(t) represents the hazard, or instantaneous risk of bankruptcy, at 
time t for company j, conditional on survival to t; α(t) is the baseline hazard; B is a 
vector of coefficients; and Xj(t) is a matrix of observations on accounting-based ratios 
from prior research, variables of creditor coordination effects, and other control 
variables. Here, the hazard ratio is defined as the likelihood odds ratio in favor of 
bankruptcy, and the baseline hazard rate is assumed to be a constant. The model is 
estimated as a discrete time logit model using maximum likelihood methods, and 
provides consistent estimates of the coefficients B.  
 
3.2 Creditor coordination effects 
3.2.1 Ex ante likelihood of creditor coordination 
1) Public debt outstanding (PUB) 
To investigate the effect of creditor coordination, I use an indicator variable, PUB, 
to represent whether a firm has public debt outstanding, which dramatically increases 
the number of creditors. Bond ownership tends to be much more diffuse than ownership 
of private debt, which tends to have fewer, more concentrated creditors. As noted in 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), owing to the Trust Indenture act of 1939, public debts 
are subject to a more severe hold-up problem. Unanimous consent being required to 
change the major terms of a bond contract, it is more difficult, and sometimes 





consequently not surprising for bankruptcy filings to result from the failure of creditors 
to coordinate in restructurings when a small group of creditors holds public debt. 
Public debt-holders also tend to have more diverse interests compared to private 
debt-holders who provide financing to the firm based on close relationships with the 
firm and based on private information. There are public debt-holders who are long-term 
investors seeking to hold debts until maturity, whereas substantial public debt-holders 
seek short-term profits for speculative purposes (Whitman and Diz, 2009). 
The recent expansion of the credit default swap (CDS) market, which enables bond-
holders to insure against default or bankruptcy linked to public debt obligations, has 
exacerbated creditor coordination problems in private restructurings for firms with 
public debt. Holding substantial amounts of CDS contracts give the CDS holders a 
strong incentive to hold up, even absent disagreement on restructuring terms. Firms that 
have public debt outstanding, and may therefore also have CDS contracts outstanding, 
are thus more likely to be subject to creditor coordination problems. 
In sum, as Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) document, having public debt 
outstanding is likely to be one of the major determinants of creditor coordination 
problems. Moreover, when the investors’ belief is more negative on future 
fundamentals of the firm, if there is higher uncertainty on the future fundamentals of 
the firm, or when the firm-specific information is more publicly exposed, creditor 
coordination problem from having public debt is likely to be exacerbated (Morris and 
Shin, 2004; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008, Hertzberg, Liberti, Paravisini, 2010). I 





coordination failure, and incorporate interaction terms with information characteristics 
as measures of creditor coordination effects. 
 
2) Current liabilities to total assets (CLTA)
13
 
According to Morris and Shin (2004), default trigger point is pushed up when there 
is higher likelihood of creditor run. One of the variables they suggest to measure the 
likelihood of lending coordination failure is the proportion of current liabilities in the 
capital structure of the firm. The rationale is that higher the current liabilities subject to 
refinancing or foreclosure, the more vulnerable the firm is to creditor coordination 
problem rising from the uncertainty over actions of creditors holding current liabilities
14
. 
If any of the short-term creditors decide not to refinance or decide to foreclose upon 
their claims, this may result in collective actions of withdrawal of credit
15
. If the 
proportion of current liabilities in the capital structure is large enough, then such lack of 
coordination among creditors is likely to disrupt the firm’s operation. Hence, the 
likelihood of lending or refinancing coordination failure is higher when there is higher 
impending liquidity needs as measured by the ratio of current liabilities to total assets
16
. 
Moreover, Morris and Shin (2004) and Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010) 
predict that lending or refinancing coordination problem arising from having higher 
proportion of short-term liabilities in the firm’s capital structure is exacerbated when 
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 In an untabulated test, I also employ an indicator variable which represents whether the firm is 
refinancing its debt. Results for this alternative variable are qualitatively similar to CLTA. 
 
14
 Firms with higher current liabilities in their capital structure are more likely  
 
15




 This measure can also capture the degree of sensitivity towards market-wide risk appetite. I address 





the firm’s ex ante credit quality is lower, or when the firm-specific information is more 
publicly exposed. Ex ante credit quality is one of the major signals creditors’ observe in 
making their decision to coordinate or not. If such signal is negative, this is likely to 
exacerbate coordination problems for firms. On the other hand, higher public exposure 
of firm-specific information through major trading venues increases the likelihood that 
any negative news will be more promptly exposed and transmitted among creditors, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of lending or refinancing
17
 coordination failure. 
Therefore, I use current liabilities to total assets as a variable to capture creditor 
coordination problems in lending or refinancing, and incorporate interaction terms with 
information characteristics as measures of creditor coordination effects. 
 
3) Long-term liabilities to total liabilities (LLTL) 
Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that when there is higher proportion of 
long-term creditors in the creditor group at the restructuring, they are less likely to 
coordinate, especially when the firm’s credit quality is low. This is because for long-
term creditors, the outcome of out-of-court restructuring is more uncertain compared to 
short-term creditors, particularly when the firm’s credit quality is low, since the 
possibility of receiving payments in longer term is more uncertain. This effect of 
creditor coordination problem due to term structure of liabilities of the firm has often 
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 Exposure in the bond market serves an example of how public exposure of information through trading 
venues exacerbates creditor coordination problems in lending or refinancing. In practice, bond prices 
often serve as a benchmark for lenders to decide whether to refinance their loan. Any negative news 
promptly impounded into bond prices will increase the likelihood that a creditor will decide not to 
refinance their loan, since a creditor is likely to be concerned that other creditors to the same firm 
concurrently observes the negative news, and based on similar concerns, would also be reluctant to 
refinance their loans. Such effect of public market exposure on creditor coordination problem is likely to 
be relevant to any actively traded secondary markets such as equity or syndicated loan markets. I 





been noted as a significant source of disagreement among creditors, leading to 
bankruptcy (Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990). I therefore use long-term liabilities to total 
liabilities (LLTL) as a variable to capture creditor coordination problems arising from 
term structure differences, and incorporate interaction terms with ex ante measure of 
credit quality as a measure of creditor coordination effects. 
 
3.2.2 Information characteristics 
1) Credit quality of the firm (ZQ or ZQLAST) 
Morris and Shin (2004) analytically show that the effect credit quality has on value 
of the debt is twofold. The first effect is referred to as conventional effect, which 
suggests that firms with weaker accounting fundamentals ex ante will have higher 
probability of default due to higher mean value of ex ante default. The second effect is 
referred to as coordination effect, which suggests that firms’ coordination effect will 
interact with conventional effect. The equations representing these two effects are as 
follows: 
∂W/∂y = √αø - ∂ψ/∂y*√αø                       (2) 
W represents asset value of the debt, y represents ex ante mean value of distribution of 
underlying state of the firm, α represents precision of the distribution of the underlying 
state of the firm, and ø represents slope of the standard normal evaluated at a certain 
point. As fundamental values of the firm deteriorates (represented by decrease in ∂W / 
∂y), not only the conventional effect drives down the price of the debt (√αø goes 
down), but also since the coordination effect is stronger as deterioration becomes more 





debt (the interaction of ∂ψ/∂y and √αø further decreases ∂W / ∂y)18. Hence, according 
to Morris and Shin (2004), firms with lower ex ante credit quality will be more likely to 
have coordination problem, ceteris paribus.  
To capture underlying state, W, or credit quality of the firm, I use Z-score using private 
firm version of the following model developed in Zmijiewski (1984):  
Log[hj(t) / (1-hj(t))] = b0 + b1*ROAj(t) + b2*TLTAj(t) + b3*CACLj(t)                  (3) 
This model incorporates major accounting ratios relevant for default prediction such as 
profitability (ROA: Net income to total assets), leverage (LTA: total liabilities to total 
assets), and liquidity (CACL: current assets to current liabilities), and has been tested as 
one of the most robust model in capturing the probability of default. I have also tried 
including ETL (EBITDA to Total liabilities) as a measure of interest coverage 
following Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), but found that the effect of this 
variable is subsumed by ROA, and does not affect my results in any way. I have also 
performed tests using Ohlson (1980)’s O-Score, as well as the score from Shumway 
(2001)’s private firm model, and found similar results for all the tests I run in this 
paper. To control for potential non-linearity of the Z-score, I rank Z-scores and use Z-
score quintiles as a measure of ex ante credit quality of the firm (―ZQ‖). Also, both 
analytical findings and anecdotal evidence suggest that for firms with worst credit 
quality, creditor coordination problem will be exacerbated when the proportion of long-
term debt-holders in the creditor group is higher due to term structure conflicts. 
Therfore, I define ZQLAST as an indicator variable which capture firms with lowest 
credit quality as measured by Z-score, and interact LLTL with ZQLAST to represent 
creditor coordination problem in restructuring arising from term structure conflicts. 
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2) Analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) 
In the stylized model of Morris and Shin (2004), higher the ex ante precision of 
information on the fundamentals, lower the effect of creditor coordination. Anecdotal 
evidence also demonstrates that if there is higher uncertainty on fundamentals of the 
firm, then it is more difficult for creditors to agree on restructuring terms, ceteris 
paribus. Hence, both in lending and private restructuring coordination, higher 
uncertainty of information on fundamentals will exacerbate the effect of coordination 
problems on the probability of default or bankruptcy.  
I use analyst forecast dispersion as the equity market-based measure of uncertainty 
on future fundamentals of the firm
19
. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Sadka and 
Scherbina (2007), Avramov et al. (2009), Ali et al. (2010) show higher analyst forecast 
dispersion to be associated with negative future stock returns explained by short-selling 
factors, liquidity, or distress risk. Guntay and Hackbarth (2010) find bond and equity 
prices to exhibit a similar pattern, firms with higher analyst forecast dispersion having 
lower bond returns in the following period. Ali et al. (2010) provide evidence that less 
corporate disclosure leads to higher analyst forecast dispersion. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that analyst forecast dispersion is a proxy for uncertainty in future 
fundamentals of the firm. 
I define DISP as the quintile value of analyst forecast dispersion after ranking it in 
ascending order, and use its interaction term with ex ante measures of creditor 
coordination failure to represent coordination effects. 
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 DISP is not available for private firms, and firms that are not covered by more than two analysts. 







3) Negative accruals (NACCQ) 
Prior research suggests that the magnitude of accruals provide information about 
future earnings and cash flows of the firm. Sloan (1996) and Richardson et al. (2005) 
find that for firms with more extreme accruals, earnings are less persistent. Richardson 
et al. (2005) relate earnings persistence to the concept of accrual reliability, and suggest 
that firms with higher proportion of less reliable accruals in their earnings have lower 
earnings persistence. Focusing more on accruals with negative values, Dechow and Ge 
(2006) provide evidence that results of lower persistence for extreme accruals is driven 
by firms with negative accruals. Melumad and Nissim (2008) suggest that different 
components of accruals can help us better understand distress risk of the firm. 
I use the quintile values of accruals ranked in the descending order, with more 
negative values (―negative accruals‖) having higher NACCQ, to capture uncertainty on 
future fundamentals of the firm perceived by creditors
20
. More extreme values of 
accruals, whether positive or negative, are likely to increase uncertainty with respect to 
future earnings and cash flows due to lower earnings persistence associated with 
accruals. However, negative accruals, in the eyes of creditors, increase uncertainty to a 
greater extent, since negative accruals represent current losses that will be realized as 
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 While Sloan (1996), Richardson et al. (2005), and Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2009), among many 
others show that investors do not seem to fully impound differential persistence of accruals and cash 
flows (known as accrual anomaly) in equity and bond prices, Dechow, Richardson and Sloan (2008) 
provide evidence that accrual anomaly is more likely to be a capturing mispricing of diminishing returns 
to new investments, rather than investors’ mispricing on differential persistence. Also, Lev and Nissim 
(2006) suggest that institutional investors understand implications in accruals. Since credit investors are 
mostly institutional investors, it is reasonable to assume that creditors are aware that accrual component 
of earnings is less persistent than cash flow component of earnings, hence, is more uncertain, less reliable, 
and associated with higher uncertainty on future fundamentals of the firm. However, to the extent that the 
such implication is not fully recognized by investors, negative accruals may not be able to fully capture 





negative cash flows in the future. Given creditors’ asymmetric loss functions – creditors 
care more about the downside risk of the firm - the more negative accruals a firm has, 




This paper uses Sloan (1996)’s definition of accruals to measure operating 
accruals
22
. While I use balance sheet approach to measure accruals in my main test 
since cash flow information is missing for substantial number of firms in my sample, I 
find very similar results when cash flow approach is used following Hribar and Collins 
(2002). To control for potential non-linearity, I rank accruals in descending order, 
allocate firm years based on operating accruals, and use quintile values for hazard 
model tests. Therefore, in my definition of negative accruals (NACCQ), most negative 
accrual firm-years are in the highest quintile, which represent highest degree of 
uncertainty with respect to negative future cash flow implications. 
 
4) Public exposure of information (CTI) 
Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010) show that when information on credit 
quality of the firm becomes publicly available, therefore, is more transparent, this alone 
can magnify coordination problem to the extent that creditors are likely to be subject to 
higher uncertainty over actions of other creditors when public information is observable 
by other creditors. As Morris and Shin (2004) point out, the notion of transparency is 
multi-faceted. In this paper, I focus on one narrow aspect of transparency, that is to say, 
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 I also employ total accruals following Richardson et al. (2005) and Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2009) to 





transparency which can affect creditor coordination through public exposure of firm-
related information through active secondary trading markets
23
.  
I construct a creditor transparency index (CTI) to capture firms’ degree of 
transparency or public exposure of information in the eyes of creditors when they make 
decision to coordinate or not. CTI increases when the firm has more actively traded 
secondary market for public debt, credit default swaps (CDS), or syndicated loan 
securities. Hence, CTI is highest for firms with actively traded public equity, public 
debt, and syndicated loans, and is the lowest for firms without actively traded 
securities. To adjust for the degree of exposure of information across different 
secondary trading markets, CTI is calculated as the following
24
: 
CTI = Median trading volume of public debt securities + Median trading volume of 
public equity securities + Median trading volume of syndicated loan securities 
I rank CTI in the ascending order, and use the quintile values of CTI to adjust for any 
non-linearity issues in my tests as a measure of public exposure of firm-specific 
information. 
 
3.2.3 Other control variables correlated with creditor coordination variables 
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 Bushman, Smith, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010) document transmission of private information 
through syndicated loan trading venues.  
 
24
 I assume that firm-specific information is most actively exposed to creditors through trading in three 
major trading venues: public debt, public equity, and syndicated loan markets. Also, I assume that the 
degree of market exposure is proportional to the number of trades. Since this measure is likely to be 
associated with the market liquidity of the firm from various trading venues, I control for various 
measures of market liquidity in my hazard model tests to ensure the adequacy of this measure. As an 
alternative way to measure CTI, I also use simple indicator variable of 1 to represent the firm’s presence 
in each of the three trading venues and define CTI as the sum of indicator variables. I find that results are 





To ensure that my findings are not capturing other capital structure or firm 
characteristics associated with distress or bankruptcy risk of the firm which are 
unrelated to creditor coordination effects, and to minimize any bias from omitted 
variables, I control for other variables used in the prior literature that may be correlated 
with my empirical measures of creditor coordination effects.  
 
1) Availability of funds from the external capital market 
Firms with more funds available from the external capital market such as public 
equity, debt, or syndicated loan markets are likely to be able to tab external capital 
markets more easily than firms without outside funds. To control for the availability of 
funds from the external capital market, I include log of book value of total liabilities 
(FD) and the log of book value of total assets (ASSETS). Including ASSETS also 
controls for the effect of firm size. My measure of ex ante likelihood of coordination 
failure, PUB, because it represents a company’s presence in the public bond market 
rather than the coordination effect of having public creditors per se in creditor 
coordination, may capture a firm’s ability to tap the external capital market. To the 
extent that firms with public debt have greater external liquidity, being more likely to 
be able to borrow from the external capital market and, hence, less likely to default, 
ceteris paribus, having this variable would bias against finding the effect of creditor 
coordination.  
 





Following Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) and Brunner and Krahnen (2008), and as 
suggested in the theoretical literature, I also run tests to control for the existence of 
senior or secured debt in the capital structure as well as proportion of bank debt, 
number of debt contracts outstanding, and ex ante recovery rates measured by market 
value of the firm over replacement value if equity market information is available. 
Including these capital structure variables does not affect my results, most likely 
because much of the effect associated with creditor coordination is dominated by the 
main variable of creditor coordination, PUB, which is consistent with the findings of 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994). Hence, I present my main results without 
these capital structure variables. 
 
3) Covenants 
I include dummy variables representing the existence of various covenants in tests 
run for a subset of my sample for which covenant information is available from 
Mergent FISD. Rauh and Sufi (2008) show that firms are more likely to include tighter 
covenants and capital structure restrictions when a firm’s credit quality is low and there 
is higher risk of default ex ante. In a similar vein, it is possible that creditors may 
include certain covenants to prevent anticipated creditor coordination problems. I 
include covenant dummies to control for a potential ex ante contracting effect. My 
results being unaffected by the inclusion of covenant dummies, and because covenant 
information is available for only about 10% of my sample, I present my main results 






4) Investment and growth 
Because including capital structure variables may capture the agency problem 
associated with overinvestment and ex ante contracting efforts to prevent such 
concerns, as suggested in Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) and Lyandres and Zhadanov 
(2007), I control for capital expenditure (CPX). To distinguish creditor coordination 
effects from confounding effects of underlying investment or growth associated with a 
higher proportion of current liabilities in the capital structure or having public debt, I 
control for the CPX. 
 
5) Information asymmetry, information uncertainty, and other financial reporting 
quality variables 
To control for the effect of information asymmetry, I run various tests including 
bid-ask spread for bonds. To control for information uncertainty, I include firm age, 
bond return volatility, and average daily turnover for bonds following Jiang, Lee, and 
Zhang (2005) whenever information is available. I also control for financial reporting 
quality measure following Francis et al.’s (2005) to control for confounding effects of 
financial reporting quality. Inasmuch as they were unaffected when they are included in 
hazard rate models, I present my main results without these variables.  
 
6) Earnings volatility (EVOLQ) 
For an alternative accounting-based measure of uncertainty on future fundamentals 
of the firm, I use earnings volatility measured over five years of previous annual 





managers believe volatile earnings tend to be less persistent (Graham et al. 2005), 
equity market and equity analysts fail to fully reflect the implication of earnings 
volatility with respect to persistence of earnings. However, even without being fully 
aware of the relationship between ex ante earnings volatility and persistence of 
earnings, as investors update their beliefs based on their observations of historical 
patterns of earnings, volatility of earnings serves as an appropriate empirical measure of 
ex ante precision of earnings. As Dichev and Tang (2009) suggest, historical earnings 
volatility is likely to contain information about uncertainty on future fundamentals of 
the firm beyond those contained in negative accruals. Therefore, I incorporate the 
quintile value of the interactions of earnings volatility (EVOLQ) with ex ante measures 
of creditor coordination failure to represent creditor coordination effects. However, I 
find that effects of EVOLQ in all of the tests are subsumed by NACCQ and other 
variables. Therefore, I exclude EVOLQ in presenting my main results. 
 
7) Other control variables associated with the availability of public information 
To prevent the availability of other information from driving my results, I control 
for sources of information from debt and equity markets that may be associated with 
variables that capture creditor coordination effects including whether the firm is rated 
by any of the three ratings agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch), and the firm’s book 
value of assets normalized by inflation rate, larger firms being more likely to have more 
public information available. Finding the effects of these other variables to be 
subsumed by my main variables of creditor coordination, I exclude them from the 






Section 4: Sample selection and sample characteristics 
4.1 Bankruptcy dataset 
The sample of bankruptcies in this paper is hand-collected and compiled from a 
number of sources including SDC Platinum restructuring database, the 2009 Compustat 
Annual Industrials file, the CRSP Monthly Stock file, the website Bankruptcy.com, and 
the list of bankruptcy filings generously provided by Lynn Lopucki
25
. The full sample 
of bankruptcies from 1980 to 2009 is 3,120 firms, but more than 30% are private firms 
(both debt and equity) for about two thirds of which financial information is not 
publicly available. Restricting my sample to COMPUSTAT firms and excluding firms 
in financial industries (SIC code 6000-6800) yields a sample of 2,518 bankruptcies. My 
final sample of 1,479 bankruptcies reflects the constraint of data required for hazard 
model analysis. The bankrupt year is defined as the calendar year in which a firm files 
for bankruptcy. Following Chava and Jarrow (2004), all COMPUSTAT firms that did 
not file for bankruptcy and are not in financial industries are included in the sample as 
non-bankrupt firms.  
(Insert Table1 here) 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by industry using 
the broad industry classification employed by Chava and Jarrow (2004). The greatest 
number of  observation of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firm years are in manufacturing, 
followed by service industries and retail trade. Finance, insurance, and real estate 
bankruptcies represent a smaller proportion of my initial sample, but are excluded from 
my final analyses due to the composition of their financial statements and default risk 
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characteristics, as noted in prior literature on bankruptcy prediction (Chava and Jarrow, 
2004). A bar chart showing the percentage of bankruptcies by industry is presented in 
Figure 1. The number of bankruptcies for each industry is comparable to other 
bankruptcy studies.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Table 2 shows the breakdown of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by calendar year. 
The frequency of bankrupt firms reflects the number of bankruptcies, and the frequency 
of non-bankrupt firms reflects the number of firm-years provided by the non-bankrupt 
firms. A bankrupt firm appears in the count only once, in the year in which its 
bankruptcy is declared. The ratio of bankrupt to non-bankrupt firms in a given year is 
hence an approximation of the relative frequency of bankruptcy. Overall, the ratio is 
less than 1%. Three peaks in the bankruptcy rate—in 1991, 2000-2001, and 2008 the 
ratio exceeded 1%—reflect three troughs in credit cycles over the past 30 years. My 
final sample is consistent with general characteristics of bankruptcy samples of public 
firms as documented in Chava and Jarrow (2004), Bharath and Shumway (2008), and 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008).  
The significant proportion of bankruptcies from the credit turmoil in the late 2000s 
in my final sample provides a new perspective on the most recent credit cycle. 
Approximately 11% of the bankruptcies in my sample are from the 2007-2009 period, 
which has been little studied to date. Compared to the 2001 recession that followed the 
Internet boom and bust, the recent credit turmoil has produced fewer bankruptcies than 
expected relative to its impact on credit markets and the economy overall. Himmelberg 





recession compared to previous recessions. But limited debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
financing has favored distressed exchange over bankruptcy. Thus, default probabilities 
have, in fact, been much higher but bankruptcies less frequent due to the illiquidity of 
the credit market during the turmoil.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 describes the composition of my sample in terms of public-private equity 
and debt status. In my sample, private equity firms are more likely than public equity 
firms to go bankrupt, but public debt firms more than twice as likely as firms without 
public debt to go bankrupt. Public status in either equity or debt tending to be 
associated with firm size and greater use of external capital, this simple classification 
provides an initial perspective on the public-private status of equity and debt firms, but 
its relationship to the probability of bankruptcy should be interpreted with caution. 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
Figure 3 describes the composition of the public-private status of the sample in 
terms of equity and debt. Most of the sample is public-equity, private-debt firms. Firms 
with public debt represent a relatively smaller proportion of 11.1%. 
 
4.2 Univariate sample characteristics 
My final sample of non-bankrupt firms is from the COMPUSTAT annual database, 
from which I also obtain accounting information for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. I 
use SDC Platinum and Moody’s Mergent FISD database for public debt and syndicated 
loan offering information, and Bloomberg for CDS trading volume information. I 





Independent variables are lagged to ensure that the data are observable prior to the 
declaration of bankruptcy. Because all sample firms file annual financial statements 
with the SEC (i.e., 10-Ks), following Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), financial 
statements are assumed to be available by the end of the third month after a firm’s 
fiscal year-end. Although quarterly statements may already have been filed several 
months prior to this time, for a firm that declares bankruptcy within three months of its 
fiscal year-end, it is assumed that the most recent year’s financial statements are not 
available and the prior fiscal year is defined as the year before bankruptcy. Because it 
does not incorporate information in quarterly financial statements, this rule is likely to 
be a conservative one that may understate the predictive power of financial statement 
data, as noted in Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005). 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for each of the explanatory variables used in 
my main tests. The main explanatory variables are accounting ratios and creditor 
coordination variables. For my main model, I use ROA, LTA, and CACL to capture the 
credit quality of a firm as measured by accounting ratios. ROA is return on total assets, 
which is measured as net income divided by total assets. LTA is total liabilities divided 
by total assets, a measure of leverage. CACL, calculated as current assets to current 
liabilities, is a measure of firm liquidity. I use the Z-score, based on Zmijewski (1984), 
as a measure of ex-ante credit quality. I found, using Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, 
Shumway’s (2001) score, and Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie’s (2005) score, that 
different models produced similar results and that a linear combination of three 





power of the financial statement variables used in other models. This result is not 
surprising because financial ratios are highly correlated.  
The three accounting ratios capture three key elements of a firm’s financial 
strength. ROA is a measure of the profitability of assets. Profitability is expected to be a 
critical element, prior research having shown capital markets to be concerned about a 
firm’s ability to repay its debts, and profitability being a key indicator of ability to pay. 
LTA, the second element, is a measure of the debt to be repaid relative to the total 
assets available as a source for repaying the debt. The third element, CACL, is a 
measure of short-term liquidity, which is also a crucial measure of a firm’s financial 
condition. 
My second set of variables consists of control variables for creditor coordination 
effects. CPX is obtained as capital expenditure over total assets. ASSETS is the log of 
the book value of a firm’s assets. I do not deflate ASSETS with GDP price index, as in 
Ohlson (1980), because in my tests this variable represents the amount of external 
capital obtained by a firm, or amount of information available on the firm. Deflating by 
GDP price index does not affect my results. I also use FD as the log of total book value 
of liabilities on the balance sheet to control for total debt financing outstanding. 
Because, used together, my variables of creditor coordination and probability of 
bankruptcy may be associated with CPX, ASSETS, and FD, I control for these 
variables to disentangle the association of creditor coordination variables with 
probability of bankruptcy. I also include Log (market value of equity) (log(MVE)) and 
book-to-market ratio (B/M) for public equity firms to control for the effect of growth 





For creditor coordination variables, I employ as my measure of the potential 
restructuring coordination problem PUB, an indicator variable that represents firms that 
have public debt outstanding. Following Morris and Shin (2004), Hertzberg, Liberti, 
and Paravisini (2010), and Brunner and Krahnen (2008), I control for lending 
coordination variables and interaction effects. CLTA, a measure of the potential lending 
coordination problem that also represents a firm’s imminent liquidity needs, is obtained 
as current liabilities minus cash and cash equivalents, minus available revolving credit 
facility, over total assets. ZQ represent ex ante credit quality of the firm measured by 
quintile values of Zmijewski (1984)’s Z-score ranked in the ascending order. Following 
Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010), I use CTI (Creditor Transparency Index) to 
represent the degree of exposure of firm-specific information from secondary trading 
venues. The CTI variable hence captures the degree of transparency afforded to 
creditors through secondary trading markets. LLTL, the ratio of long-term liabilities to 
total liabilities, is used to capture the term structure conflicts. Following Hertzberg, 
Liberti, and Paravisini (2010), ZQLAST is included as an interaction effect of low 
credit quality that is set to 1 when a firm’s Z-score is in the highest quintile and its 
credit quality, hence, is the lowest. DISP, and NACCQ represent uncertainty on future 
fundamentals of the firm. DISP represents quintiles of analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion. Following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), analyst earnings forecast 
is measured as the standard deviation of the 1-year ahead equity analyst forecast over 
the median forecast. NACCQ represents quintile values of negative operating accruals 





Table 4 provides summary statistics including the mean, median, and standard 
deviation values of the individual variables for the bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in 
each of the four years prior to bankruptcy. The financial ratios of the bankrupt firms 
exhibit mean and median differences for as much as four years prior to bankruptcy, and 
the deterioration of the ratios becomes progressive as the year of bankruptcy 
approaches. These results are similar in spirit to those reported by Beaver (1966) and in 
subsequent research. This descriptive statistic can provide some preliminary indication 
of the behavior of the variables prior to bankruptcy. Following Shumway (2001), I 
mitigate the effects of outliers on the estimates of the hazard model parameters by 
winsorizing all observations at the 1% level and 99% level, respectively. As a result, 
the minimum and maximum values for each of the four years before bankruptcy and for 
the non-bankrupt firm distribution are identical, as reported in Table 4. This trend not 
being apparent in PUB, CTI, and some other variables, their association with the 
probability of bankruptcy should be explored in multivariate hazard model tests. 
This trend not being apparent in PUB, CTI, and some other variables, their 
association with the probability of bankruptcy should be explored in multivariate 
hazard model tests. Figures 4-21 present similar information graphically by plotting 
empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDF). 
(Insert Figures 4-21 here) 
Each figure reports the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt firms. As noted in Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), the CDF is 
informative over the entire distribution of each variable. The figures show the CDFs of 





variables RSIZ, EXRET, LSIGMA for bankrupt firms, to be distinct from those for 
non-bankrupt firms. DISP and ACCQ, also follow this pattern, suggesting that 
uncertainty on future cash flows or negative prospects on the firm reflected in accruals 
is higher for bankrupt firms. The CDF of ZQ (Zmijewski’s score quintile) demonstrates 
that Zmijewski’s model is also able to capture the probability of bankruptcy, 90% of the 
bankrupt firms being classified in the highest Z-score quintile. Taken together, these 
findings are consistent with CDF plots in Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), and 
reflect differences in the distribution of fundamentals when firms approach bankruptcy. 
Measures of creditor coordination, investment, and other control variables do not 
exhibit consistent patterns as firms approach bankruptcy. Bankrupt firms tend to have 
lower capital expenditures, more assets, a higher BV of debt, and higher current 
liabilities in capital structure than non-bankrupt firms. Bankrupt firms also tend to have 
higher DISP and NACCQ, and be more likely to have public debt, than non-bankrupt 
firms. B/M ratio, LLTL, and log (MVE) also do not exhibit significant patterns in CDF 
plots. Although these findings provide preliminary implications of the association of 
DISP, NACCQ, and creditor coordination with ex post bankruptcy outcomes, 
multivariate hazard model analyses are required to draw meaningful conclusions about 
each variable’s incremental effect.   
 
4.3 Correlation table 
Before initiating multivariate analyses, I examine correlations among major 
variables in hazard models. Table 5 presents Spearman’s correlation coefficients on the 





(Insert Table 5 here) 
Major accounting and market variables are correlated in expected ways. ROA is 
positively associated with RSIZ and EXRET and negatively associated with LSIGMA. 
ROA is also positively associated with CPX, ASSETS, FD, and Log (MVE). Leverage 
(LTA) is negatively associated with CACL, but positively associated with ASSETS and 
ratios of liabilities such as CLTA and LLTL, highly leveraged firms being more likely 
to have higher proportions of current liabilities subject to creditor coordination in the 
capital structure and more long-term debt.   
My main measure of ex ante coordination failure, PUB, is positively associated 
with LTA, ASSETS, FD, and CTI. Firms with significant assets are more likely to be 
able to tap the public debt capital market, and their book value of assets and liabilities 
consequently likely to be high. Also, most firms with public debt are likely to have 
public equity and syndicated loans traded, and hence, has higher exposure of firm-
specific information. 
The measure of lending coordination (Morris and Shin, 2004), CLTA, is positively 
associated with LTA and ZQ and negatively associated with CACL, CTI, and LLTL. 
Firms subject to higher creditor coordination problems in lending are also likely to be 
less liquid, less transparent, and have fewer total liabilities in their debt structure 
(Morris and Shin, 2004). 
Variables relevant to creditor coordination effects exhibit predicted associations. 
Firms with higher DISP, and NACCQ tending to have lower ROA and CACL, and 
higher ex ante default risk as measured by ZQ (Zmijewski, 1984’s score). In sum, the 





correlated, and DISP, NACCQ, CTI, and other variables related to creditor coordination 
to be correlated with other accounting variables. Hence, their net effect on bankruptcy 
outcomes can only be investigated in a multivariate framework with appropriate 
controls. 
 
Section 5: Empirical Results 
5.1 Hazard model estimation results  
Table 6 reports the results of my hazard model estimation, following Shumway 
(2001), for 1-year forecasting horizons. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) show 
that the reduced-form econometric approach of the hazard model results in superior in-
sample fit and out-of-sample accuracy relative to other default and bankruptcy 
prediction models such as that of Vassalou and Xing (2004). Duffie, Saita, and Wang 
(2007), comparing their results with those of Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie’s (2005) 
hazard rate model, find their in-sample fit and out-of-sample accuracy comparable to 
that of Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), confirming the superior predictability of 
the reduced form model compared to structural models. Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
also show that the more flexible form of estimation enabled by the reduced econometric 
form of the hazard model affords predictability over and above that of other default 
and/or bankruptcy prediction models to date.  
Based on these findings, I use the hazard model to estimate the role of analyst 
forecast dispersion and accruals in bankruptcy. As Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005) 
note, due to the high level of correlation among variables used to predict bankruptcy, to 





fit, my main results employ accounting variables following the most rigorous model 
used by Zmijewski (1984). Using variables from Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) yield similar results for creditor coordination variables. 
This confirms that my results are robust to the models employed, and that the effects of 
my variables are not subsumed by other predictors of default or bankruptcy from the 
prior literature. To control for year- and industry-specific effects, I also include year 
and industry fixed effects in the hazard rate estimation.  
I provide my results separately for the private and public firm models. I show my 
findings to be robust to the inclusion of equity market variables, and that there is more 
to be gained from using analyst forecast dispersion, accruals, creditor coordination, and 
other control variables to significantly increase in-sample fit and out-of-sample 
forecasting accuracy when both private and public firm models are estimated. Table 6 
reports the estimated coefficients for the hazard model under the private firm 
specification. Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for the hazard model under the 
private firm specification.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Consistent with Zmijewski (1984), all accounting variables are significant. Most 
importantly, interaction effects of coordination variables are significant in all three 
models, indicating that creditor coordination variables have additional explanatory 
power over and above other variables. Firms with higher analyst forecast dispersion or 
more negative accruals are more likely to file for bankruptcy after controlling for other 





effects provide information on future bankruptcy outcomes over and above that 
provided by other predictors of bankruptcy.  
In Model 3, a major variable that represents ex ante likelihood of creditor 
coordination failure, PUB, is positively associated with the probability of bankruptcy 
for firms with higher DISP or higher NACCQ, as measured by interaction terms of 
PUB with DISP and NACCQ. These results are consistent with negative accruals and 
earnings volatility containing information that affects creditors’ coordination, and, 
hence, the probability of bankruptcy, to a greater extent for firms with public debt.  
Another variable of creditor coordination, CLTA, is positively associated with the 
probability of bankruptcy for firms with higher CTI and worse credit quality, as 
measured by interaction terms with CTI and ZQ. CLTA is, however, negatively 
associated with the probability of bankruptcy for other firms, consistent with greater 
transparency and worse credit quality aggravating lending coordination and increasing 
the probability of bankruptcy. These results are consistent with Morris and Shin (2004). 
But the interaction term of PUB and CTI is negatively and significantly associated with 
the probability of bankruptcy, consistent with transparency ameliorating the creditor 
coordination problem in restructuring, as shown in Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini 
(2010). That the interaction term of LLTL and ZQLAST is also significant suggests 
that firms with low credit quality and a higher proportion of long-term creditors within 
a creditor group have a higher probability of bankruptcy. These results are also 
consistent with creditor coordination problems arising from term structure differences, 





Model 4 and Model 5 represent public firm models in which equity market 
variables are included. That DISP, and NACCQ are not significant in Model 4 suggests 
that equity market prices impound information regarding DISP and NACCQ as 
predictors of bankruptcy outcome. But the interaction effects of DISP, and NACCQ 
with PUB remain statistically significant in both models. The interaction effect is 
stronger for DISP than NACCQ, but both effects are significant at the 5% level, and 
each interaction term has distinctive effects, as shown in Model 3. This suggests that 
the effect of analyst forecast dispersion, negative accruals, and earnings volatility is 
much stronger for firms with public debts, and not fully impounded into equity market 
prices for firms subject to more severe creditor coordination problems. 
Overall, the results of the hazard model tests are consistent with creditor 
coordination effects providing incremental information on future bankruptcy outcomes.  
 
5.2 In-sample forecasting accuracy 
My main framework of bankruptcy prediction, based on Zmijewski (1984) and 
Shumway (2001), compares the in-sample fit of the model with and without creditor 
coordination effects across different model specifications. I estimate the hazard models 
using variables based on Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), and 
Shumway (2001). The chi-square statistics presented in Table 7 and Table 8 
demonstrate that incorporating creditor coordination effects significantly improves in-
sample fit as shown by the P-values of comparison across the models.  





For both private firm models (Table 7) and public firm models (Table 8), in-sample 
fit is improved significantly not only relative to the original model (Model 1) and 
model with additional variables (Model 2 or Model 3), but also compared to the 
appended model without interaction terms (Model 2) and final model with interaction 
terms (Model 3). That creditor coordination variables improve in-sample fit suggests 
that these additional variables representing creditor coordination effects are 
economically significant predictors of bankruptcy. Including interaction terms with the 
creditor coordination effects further improves in-sample fit, consistent with creditor 
coordination effects significantly affecting creditor coordination, and, in turn, the 
probability of bankruptcy.  
 
5.3 Out-of-sample forecasting accuracy 
I first report comparisons of out-of-sample forecasting accuracy for 2005-2009 
using the hazard model estimated with observations from the earlier period, 1980-2004, 
and classification tables that follow Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Beaver, McNichols, 
and Rhie (2005). The probabilities of bankruptcy are calculated for each year based on 
the hazard model estimation, and the companies are grouped into deciles according to 
these probabilities. The number of bankruptcies in each decile for each year are 
aggregated over 2005-2009 and reported in Table 9 and Table 10.  
(Insert Table 9 and Table 10 here) 
I investigate whether creditor coordination effects are economically meaningful in 
the sense that it can improve the forecasting accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models, 





correlations, by estimating the out-of-sample accuracy of the hazard models with and 
without creditor coordination variables, using different model specifications suggested 
by the prior literature on bankruptcy prediction. I estimate the hazard models using 
variables from Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), and Shumway 
(2004). For all of these models, improvement in out-of-sample forecasting accuracy is 
apparent from the results, higher proportions of bankrupt firms being reported in the 
first and second probability deciles.  
Figures 22 to 29 illustrate graphically the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy for 
year-by-year bankruptcy predictions based on up-to-date historical data. The area under 
the ROC curve is presented, following Chava and Jarrow (2004), as a measure of 
comprehensive out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. 
(Insert Figures 22 to 29 here) 
I first estimate a model with data from 1980 up to the prior year of estimation, then 
use this model to predict bankruptcy outcomes for the year of estimation. Hence, 
bankruptcy probabilities are calculated for each year for each firm, and an ROC curve 
constructed from predicted probabilities and the status of each firm in each year. The 
area under the ROC curve is computed as a measure of the model’s forecasting 
accuracy. This procedure is repeated for every year up to 2009. 
As noted in Chava and Jarrow (2004), the area under the power, or ROC (Receiver 
Operating Characteristic), curve is a widely used measure of the out-of-sample 
accuracy of forecasting models (Sobehart, Keenan, and Stein, 2000). For comparison 
across models, the area under the ROC curve is measured relative to the area of the unit 





value of 1.0 perfect discrimination. Chava and Jarrow (2004) report the mean area 
under the ROC curve to be 0.9101 for their model with industry effects, and 0.9113 for 
Shumway’s (2001) public firm model. For the private firm model, the mean area under 
ROC curve is much lower, at 0.7646 for Chava and Jarrow’s (2004), and 0.7513 for 
Shumway’s (2001), model. As Chava and Jarrow (2004) demonstrate, to increase the 
area under the ROC, the variables included should not only be highly significant, but 
also have incremental effects not subsumed by other variables in the model. 
I find for both the private and public firm models that including creditor 
coordination effects and control variables significantly improves the forecasting 
accuracy of bankruptcy prediction, as measured by the area under the ROC curve, 
compared to models without these variables. 
 The mean area under the ROC curve increased from 0.681 to 0.837 using Altman’s 
(1968) variables, and from 0.790 to 0.861 using Ohlson’s (1980) variables. Of the four 
models, Shumway’s (2001) original model seems to have the best out-of-sample 
accuracy, with a mean area under the ROC curve of 0.803, which is improved by 
including my variables to 0.841. Using my main model of estimation based on 
Zmijewski’s (1984) variables, I find that forecasting accuracy increases from 0.733 to 
0.848. Performing, in an untabulated test, a stepwise regression with all candidate 
accounting ratios from the prior literature used together in the hazard model, I find a 
significant improvement in forecasting accuracy. I therefore conclude that my findings 






That improvement in out-of-sample forecasting accuracy is sizeable for private firm 
models across all model specifications, as presented in Figures 22 to 25, suggests that 
including the additional variables proposed in this paper, especially for private equity 
firms without timely equity market information, improves the forecasting accuracy of 
these models substantially. Given that private equity firms represent more than half of 
the high-yield corporate bond market, this finding is likely to be useful to academics, 
practitioners, and investors interested in estimating the probability of bankruptcy more 
accurately for private equity firms.  
Improvement in forecasting accuracy as measured by the area under the ROC curve, 
albeit less striking, is nevertheless significant and consistent across different model 
specifications for public firm models, as presented in Figures 26 to 29. Forecasting 
accuracy increases from 0.852 to 0.875 for the model with Altman’s (1968) variables, 
from 0.866 to 0.883 for Shumway’s (2001) model, from 0.873 to 0.890 for Bharath and 
Shumway’s (2008) specification, and from 0.868 to 0.885 for the main hazard rate 
model specification in this paper. Taken together, these findings suggest that adding the 
variables used in my analyses to capture the role of analyst forecast dispersion, 
accruals, and creditor coordination in bankruptcy outcomes can help academics, 
managers, investors, and regulators more accurately predict bankruptcies. 
 
Section 6: Robustness checks 






As mentioned earlier, I perform my main tests using the hazard model, controlling 
for the existence of senior and secured debt as well as the proportion of bank debt, and 
number of debt contracts outstanding. I also include covenant dummies and rating 
information as controls for capital structure, ex ante contracting incentives, information 
environment, and measures of information asymmetry such as bid-ask spreads. Finally, 
I include measures of market-wide risk premium such as VIX index and NBER. I 
include the VIX index quintile (VIX) to control for potential market volatility which 
can serve as a proxy for market-wide risk premium. I also include NBER, an indicator 
variable set to 1 for recessions and 0 for other periods according to the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), since during recessions, investors are more risk averse 
in lending or refinancing, which can be associated with my ex ante measures of creditor 
coordination such as PUB and CLTA. This is because for firms that are subject to 
higher likelihood of ex ante creditor coordination failure such as public debt firms or 
firms with higher proportion of short-term debt in the capital structure,  
Data availability constrained these tests to a subset of only about 10-20% of the 
final full sample. Nonetheless, I find that including these variables in a smaller sample 
does not affect the overall tenor of my results. Therefore, I conclude that to the extent 
that the variables I incorporate capture capital structure characteristics, information 
asymmetry, or market risk premium which can be correlated with my measures of 
creditor coordination effects, variables representing creditor coordination effects are 
unaffected by these control variables, consistent with theoretical predictions.  
 





Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008) present evidence consistent with accounting 
quality affecting firms’ choices of debt capital markets. They show firms that issue 
public debt to have superior accounting quality relative to firms with only private debt. 
Following prior literature (Katz, 2009; Balachandran, Kogut, and Harnal, 2010), I use 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach to control for any endogeneity that might 
result from selecting public debt. In the first stage, I estimate a probit selection model 
using size (total assets and sales), leverage (LTA), profitability (ROA), and current 
assets to current liabilities (CACL) as my predictor variables, which Denis and Mihov 
(2002) show to be relevant to the choice of public debt. All of these variables are 
significant at the 1% level. I then use the estimates of this PROBIT model to compose 
the inverse Mills ratio for each sample firm, which I include in the second stage, 
allowing its coefficient to vary between firms with and without private debt, as a 
control in the hazard rate estimation models. I also perform similar tests for the 
proportion of short-term debt in the capital structure based on Denis and Mihov (2002).  
My results, after controlling for the endogeneity, remaining qualitatively unaltered, 
I rely on the main results of the hazard models after controlling for the main selection 
variables ROA, LTA, and CACL, which coincide with the accounting variables 
included in my main model. 
 
6.3 Analyses with detailed accrual components 
I also conduct my hazard rate model analyses with more detailed accrual components. I 
use total accruals to calculate negative accruals (NACCQ), and decompose these 





accruals with higher reliability having less persistence, hence higher uncertainty on 
future fundamentals, I find that only the operating component of total accruals are 
significant in the hazard rate test. This is also consistent with Ozel (2010). Ozel (2010) 
provides evidence that private debt-holders consider working capital accruals to be 
most informative. Hence, results on NACCQ and its specific components are consistent 
with adopting NACCQ as a measure of uncertainty on future fundamentals of the firm. 
  
Section 7: Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, I provide evidence on the significant role played by creditor 
coordination effects in bankruptcy prediction. Using a hand-collected sample of 
bankruptcy filings for the period 1980-2009, I find creditor coordination effects to be 
significant incremental predictors of bankruptcy. After controlling for other predictors 
of bankruptcy suggested in the prior literature, I find firms with higher ex ante 
likelihood of creditor coordination failure interacted by information characteristics to 
be more likely than otherwise similar firms to file for bankruptcy. Consequently, I 
document a significant increase in out-of-sample forecast accuracy across 20 years of 
forecasting period, consistently for different model specifications, after including 
creditor coordination effects. Taken together, results suggest that creditor coordination 
effects provide marginal information on the firm’s probability of bankruptcy, and we 
can predict bankruptcy more accurately for private firms by including creditor 
coordination effects into hazard rate bankruptcy prediction models. 
Possible extensions of this study include exploring other variables that capture 





based on information characteristics or accounting ratios, which can help us predict 
bankruptcies more accurately with creditor coordination effects. Also, investigating 
other information relevant to creditors’ in coordinating among themselves could shed 
further light on the dynamics of creditors’ use of information and the association of that 





Table 1: Bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by industry 
 
This table presents bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by industry following broader classification in 





SIC Code Industry name 

















































Service 280 39,987 40,267 0.70% 
 








Table 2: Bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by year 
 
This table presents distribution of bankrupt vs. non-bankrupt firms over the sample period of 1980 to 
2009. Bankrupt year is defined as the calendar year in which the firm filed for bankruptcy.  
 
    
Year Non-bankrupt Bankrupt Total % of bankrupt firms 
1980  5,071  6  5,077  0.12% 
1981  4,834  9  4,843  0.19% 
1982  4,889  12  4,901  0.24% 
1983  4,978  4  4,982  0.08% 
1984  5,323  14  5,337  0.26% 
1985  5,377  21  5,398  0.39% 
1986  5,651  18  5,669  0.32% 
1987  6,030  20  6,050  0.33% 
1988  6,166  32  6,198  0.52% 
1989  6,080  35  6,115  0.57% 
1990  5,929  55  5,984  0.92% 
1991  5,917  67  5,984  1.12% 
1992  5,979  43  6,022  0.71% 
1993  6,187  39  6,226  0.63% 
1994  6,601  32  6,633  0.48% 
1995  6,984  29  7,013  0.41% 
1996  7,421  35  7,456  0.47% 
1997  8,230  52  8,282  0.63% 
1998  8,191  71  8,262  0.86% 
1999  7,922  81  8,003  1.01% 
2000  8,238  141  8,379  1.68% 
2001  8,056  182  8,238  2.21% 
2002  7,728  137  7,865  1.74% 
2003  7,409  89  7,498  1.19% 
2004  7,283  38  7,321  0.52% 
2005  7,150  37  7,187  0.51% 
2006  6,951  31  6,982  0.44% 
2007  6,834  43  6,877  0.63% 
2008  6,535  81  6,616  1.22% 
2009  4,911  43  4,954  0.87% 
















Table 3: Bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by private-public status 
 
This table presents composition of bankrupt vs. non-bankrupt firms over the sample period of 1980 to 
2009 by having public equity and public debt outstanding. 
 
Panel A: Equity   
  Non-bankrupt Bankrupt % of bankrupt firms 
Private 79,760 527 0.7% 
Public 181,458 970 0.5% 
    
Panel B: Debt   
  Non-bankrupt Bankrupt % of bankrupt firms 
Private 232,358 1,159 0.5% 

































Table 4: Descriptive statistics for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by years 
before bankruptcy 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses of bankrupt and non-
bankrupt firms. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99%, following Shumway (2001). 
 
Panel A: 1 year before bankruptcy      
( N = 1,479) Min. 1Q Median Mean 3Q Max. SD 
ROA -1.98 -0.16 0.00 -0.13 0.07 0.48 0.39 
LTA 0.06 0.68 0.87 1.03 1.13 4.99 0.73 
CACL 0.04 0.51 1.00 1.27 1.60 14.87 1.25 
RSIZ -15.06 -13.80 -12.80 -12.63 -11.63 -5.74 1.58 
EXRET -0.84 -0.80 -0.63 -0.50 -0.37 2.19 0.45 
LSIGMA 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.46 0.11 
CPX 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.53 0.11 
ASSETS 0.00 0.85 3.34 19.06 11.57 119.3 72.9 
FD 0.00 0.66 3.01 18.11 10.64 231.2 80.6 
LOGMVE 7.04 9.05 10.04 10.18 11.07 16.71 1.58 
B/M -0.29 0.08 0.76 1.57 1.77 28.76 3.01 
CLTA 0.05 0.24 0.43 0.63 0.78 4.99 0.69 
CTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.93 2.14 2.66 0.69 
ZQ 1.00 5.00 5.00 4.67 5.00 5.00 0.76 
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.42 
NACCQ 1.00 5.00 8.00 7.04 10.00 10.00 2.99 
DISP 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.21 4.00 5.00 1.32 
LLTL 0.00 0.09 0.39 0.40 0.68 0.93 0.31 
        
Panel B: 2 years before bankruptcy      
( N = 1,485) Min. 1Q Median Mean 3Q Max. SD 
        
ROA -1.98 -0.11 0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.48 0.37 
LTA 0.02 0.56 0.74 0.84 0.93 4.99 0.64 
CACL 0.04 0.88 1.42 1.90 2.19 27.51 2.02 
RSIZ -15.06 -13.12 -12.05 -11.95 -10.86 -5.83 1.61 
EXRET -0.84 -0.64 -0.43 -0.26 -0.09 2.19 0.58 
LSIGMA 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.46 0.10 
CPX 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.53 0.11 
ASSETS 0.00 0.91 3.30 19.12 11.91 119.3 69.32 
FD 0.00 0.53 2.34 15.23 9.36 147.8 59.53 
LOGMVE 7.04 9.76 10.77 10.90 11.91 16.71 1.66 
B/M -0.29 0.22 0.65 1.20 1.37 28.76 2.16 
CLTA 0.02 0.18 0.29 0.43 0.48 4.99 0.55 
CTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.01 2.13 2.66 0.65 
ZQ 1.00 4.00 5.00 4.32 5.00 5.00 1.04 
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.41 
NACCQ 1.00 3.00 7.00 6.11 9.00 10.00 3.13 
DISP 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.07 4.00 5.00 1.39 






Table 4: Descriptive statistics for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by years 
before bankruptcy 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses of bankrupt and non-
bankrupt firms. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99%, following Shumway (2001). 
 
Panel C: 3 years before bankruptcy      
( N = 1,452) Min. 1Q Median Mean 3Q Max. SD 
        
ROA -1.98 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.13 0.48 0.39 
LTA 0.02 0.49 0.68 0.76 0.86 4.99 0.61 
CACL 0.04 1.02 1.57 2.21 2.40 27.51 2.70 
RSIZ -15.06 -12.71 -11.70 -11.61 -10.56 -5.41 1.58 
EXRET -0.84 -0.51 -0.27 -0.11 0.11 2.19 0.62 
LSIGMA 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.46 0.09 
CPX 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.53 0.11 
ASSETS 0.00 0.88 3.36 18.08 12.03 119.3 66.90 
FD 0.11 0.46 2.11 13.95 8.87 122.1 54.93 
LOGMVE 7.04 10.04 11.04 11.16 12.20 16.71 1.63 
B/M -0.29 0.24 0.59 0.97 1.15 28.76 1.74 
CLTA 0.02 0.17 0.27 0.39 0.42 4.99 0.56 
CTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 2.10 3.00 0.64 
ZQ 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.03 5.00 5.00 1.17 
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.42 
NACCQ 1.00 3.00 6.00 5.75 9.00 10.00 3.18 
DISP 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.09 4.00 5.00 1.42 
LLTL 0.00 0.18 0.51 0.47 0.73 0.93 0.30 
        
Panel D: 4 years before bankruptcy      
( N = 1,404) Min. 1Q Median Mean 3Q Max. SD 
        
ROA -1.98 -0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.14 0.48 0.40 
LTA 0.03 0.47 0.65 0.73 0.83 4.99 0.62 
CACL 0.04 1.07 1.64 2.38 2.53 27.51 3.04 
RSIZ -15.06 
-
12.56 -11.50 -11.45 -10.40 -5.35 1.60 
EXRET -0.84 -0.47 -0.24 -0.09 0.11 2.19 0.59 
LSIGMA 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.46 0.09 
CPX 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.53 0.11 
ASSETS 0.00 0.81 3.33 16.85 11.28 119.3 61.83 
FD 0.00 0.36 1.89 12.58 7.97 115.4 48.73 
LOGMVE 7.04 10.02 11.11 11.19 12.26 16.44 1.63 
B/M -0.29 0.25 0.56 0.86 1.04 28.76 1.57 
CLTA 0.02 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.41 4.99 0.50 
CTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.98 2.01 3.00 0.62 
ZQ 1.00 3.00 4.00 3.86 5.00 5.00 1.24 
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.40 
NACCQ 1.00 3.00 6.00 5.60 9.00 10.00 3.12 
DISP 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.10 4.00 5.00 1.40 





Table 4: Descriptive statistics for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms by years 
before bankruptcy 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses of bankrupt and non-
bankrupt firms. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99%, following Shumway (2001). 
 
Panel E: Non-bankrupt years 
( N = 258,011) Min. 1Q Median Mean 3Q Max. SD 
        
ROA -1.98 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.19 0.48 0.33 
LTA 0.02 0.32 0.50 0.58 0.66 4.99 0.59 
CACL 0.04 1.21 1.92 2.78 3.01 27.51 3.46 
RSIZ -15.06 -12.15 -10.77 -10.64 -9.23 -5.35 2.10 
EXRET -0.84 -0.29 -0.05 0.02 0.20 2.19 0.51 
LSIGMA 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.46 0.08 
CPX 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.53 0.09 
ASSETS 0.00 0.51 2.42 34.41 12.85 119.3 123.82 
FD 0.00 0.19 1.03 20.86 6.82 129.6 79.66 
LOGMVE 7.04 9.74 11.17 11.33 12.80 16.71 2.13 
B/M -0.29 0.33 0.62 1.26 1.12 28.76 3.29 
CLTA 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.33 0.35 4.99 0.52 
CTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.83 2.00 3.00 0.61 
ZQ 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.97 4.00 5.00 1.41 
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.31 
NACCQ 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.48 8.00 10.00 2.86 
DISP 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.42 
LLTL 0.00 0.14 0.41 0.40 0.63 0.93 0.28 
        
Panel F: Full sample of bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firm years    
 (N=262,715) Min. 1Q Median Mean 3Q Max. SD 
        
ROA -1.98 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.48 0.34 
LTA 0.02 0.33 0.51 0.59 0.67 4.99 0.59 
CACL 0.04 1.20 1.90 2.76 2.99 27.51 3.44 
RSIZ -15.06 -12.19 -10.81 -10.67 -9.27 -5.35 2.10 
EXRET -0.84 -0.30 -0.05 0.01 0.20 2.19 0.52 
LSIGMA 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.46 0.08 
CPX 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.53 0.09 
ASSETS 0.00 0.52 2.44 33.91 12.80 11.93 122.53 
FD 0.00 0.20 1.06 20.67 6.92 23.12 79.15 
LOGMVE 7.04 9.74 11.16 11.31 12.77 16.71 2.12 
B/M -0.29 0.33 0.62 1.26 1.12 28.76 3.26 
CLTA 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.34 0.36 4.99 0.52 
CTI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.83 2.00 3.00 0.62 
ZQ 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.41 
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.31 
NACCQ 1.00 3.00 6.00 5.50 8.00 10.00 2.87 
DISP 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.42 





Table 5: Correlation table 
 
This table presents correlation coefficients of major variables in hazard rate model. The upper diagonal 
represents Spearman’s correlation coefficients, whereas lower diagonal represents Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients. Following Shumway (2001), all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Description 
of variables is provided in Appendix. 
 
  ROA LTA CACL RSIZ EXRET LSIGMA CPX ASSETS FD 
ROA 1 -0.06 0.03 0.45 0.31 -0.37 0.34 0.33 0.30 
LTA -0.49 1 -0.66 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.24 0.46 
CACL -0.04 -0.31 1 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.18 -0.19 -0.35 
RSIZ 0.24 -0.02 -0.09 1 0.31 -0.51 0.27 0.80 0.74 
EXRET 0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.20 1 -0.09 0.03 0.15 0.13 
LSIGMA -0.26 0.03 0.06 -0.50 0.10 1 -0.15 -0.51 -0.48 
CPX 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 1 0.18 0.19 
ASSETS 0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.43 0.01 -0.22 -0.01 1 0.96 
FD 0.08 0.03 -0.10 0.39 0.01 -0.20 -0.01 0.96 1 
LOGMVE 0.16 -0.01 -0.05 0.83 0.18 -0.35 0.04 0.47 0.43 
B/M 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.33 0.31 
CLTA -0.53 0.87 -0.23 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 
CTI 0.19 -0.16 -0.03 0.15 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.22 0.22 
ZQ -0.44 0.52 -0.34 -0.19 -0.13 0.21 -0.08 0.05 0.10 
PUB 0.10 0.04 -0.11 0.25 0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.30 0.31 
NACCQ -0.16 0.16 -0.16 -0.06 -0.06 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.04 
DISP -0.11 0.07 -0.01 -0.27 -0.04 0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 
LLTL 0.21 0.07 -0.14 0.25 0.00 -0.22 0.16 0.17 0.17 
          
  LOGMVE B/M CLTA CTI ZQ PUB NACCQ DISP LLTL 
ROA 0.32 -0.10 -0.05 0.11 -0.48 0.09 -0.17 -0.19 0.12 
LTA -0.02 -0.03 0.49 0.23 0.82 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.46 
CACL -0.03 0.01 -0.50 -0.19 -0.53 -0.18 -0.27 -0.03 -0.17 
RSIZ 0.85 -0.21 -0.17 0.26 -0.18 0.28 -0.08 -0.36 0.28 
EXRET 0.26 -0.23 -0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 
LSIGMA -0.40 -0.14 0.13 -0.16 0.16 -0.19 0.07 0.17 -0.25 
CPX 0.17 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.11 0.04 0.06 -0.08 0.23 
ASSETS 0.80 0.13 -0.11 0.44 0.02 0.41 0.01 -0.35 0.42 
FD 0.72 0.12 0.04 0.45 0.21 0.43 0.04 -0.31 0.51 
LOGMVE 1 -0.33 -0.21 0.43 -0.15 0.38 -0.02 -0.46 0.24 
B/M -0.14 1 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.17 0.11 
CLTA -0.08 0.00 1 -0.04 0.41 -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.41 
CTI 0.27 0.04 -0.20 1 0.13 0.84 0.06 -0.34 0.28 
ZQ -0.12 0.04 0.34 -0.05 1 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.31 
PUB 0.42 0.07 -0.07 0.63 0.13 1 0.06 -0.29 0.28 
NACCQ 0.00 0.04 0.13 -0.02 0.18 0.05 1 0.02 0.07 
DISP -0.44 0.04 0.08 -0.32 0.10 -0.24 0.02 1 -0.08 






Table 6: Hazard model estimation results 
 
This table presents hazard model estimation results for probability 1-year prior to bankruptcy. Hazard 
rate model is estimated following Shumway (2001). Description of variables is provided in Appendix.  
P-values reported below coefficients: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10% 
  Private firm model Public firm model 
Variables Model1   Model2   Model3   Model4   
Model
5   
ROA -0.341  -0.911  -0.523  -0.611  -0.518  
 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
LTA 0.281  0.603  0.073  0.387  0.218  
 0.001 *** 0.016 * 0.433  0.008 *** 0.153  
CACL -0.184  -0.126  -0.217  -0.139  -0.171  
 0.000 *** 0.017 * 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
ASSETS 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 0.000 *** 0.004 ** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.015 ** 
CPX 1.062  3.695  0.959  1.461  1.376  
 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
FD 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 0.000 *** 0.028 * 0.000 *** 0.009 ** 0.069 . 
ZQ 1.202  1.051  0.586  0.860  0.503  
 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
CLTA -0.321  -0.294  -8.272  0.140  -5.022  
 0.001 *** 0.430  0.000 *** 0.465  0.028 ** 
PUB 0.035  0.320  0.345  -0.260  0.802  
 0.742  0.238  0.250  0.456  0.425  
LLTL -1.010  -1.624  -1.708  -0.120  -0.506  
 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.604  0.167  
NACCQ 0.058    0.038  0.015  -0.002  
 0.000 ***   0.000 *** 0.256  0.888  
CTI 0.439  0.341  0.260  0.832  0.000  
 0.000 *** 0.002 ** 0.001 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 *** 
ZQLAST     -0.212    -0.506  
     0.369    0.981  
RSIZ       -0.225  -0.203  
       0.278  0.332  
EXRET       -1.942  -1.884  
       0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
LSIGMA       2.934  2.817  
       0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
LOGMVE       0.151  0.131  
       0.456  0.522  
B/M       0.022  0.020  
       0.031 ** 0.061 . 
DISP   0.245  0.103  0.033  -0.031  
   0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.248  0.336  
CLTA * CTI     0.625    0.893  
     0.000 ***   0.001 *** 
CLTA*ZQ     1.617    0.878  
     0.000 ***   0.052 . 
PUB*NACCQ     0.097    0.091  
     0.001 ***   0.010 ** 
PUB*DISP     0.137    0.259  
     0.000 ***   0.000 *** 
PUB*CTI     -0.561    -1.507  
     0.000 ***   0.002 *** 
LLTL*ZQLAST     1.420    0.803  
     0.000 ***   0.035 ** 
Industry fix. eff. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  





Table 7: Private firm models: Comparisons of in-sample fit 
 
Private firm models are estimated with hazard model following Shumway (2001) using variables from 
respective model. The P-value of chi-square statistics are reported to estimate increase in in-sample fit of 
the model. The sample contains variables from the final sample of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms 
spanning 1980 to 2009. Observations used for each model is subject to availability of variables. 
Following Shumway (2001), all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level.  
 
Panel A: Altman (1968)  
Model 1: Y ~ (WCTA + RETA + EBTA + SLTA) 
Model 2: Y ~ (WCTA + RETA + EBTA + SLTA) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (ZQ +  CLTA + PUB + 
LLTL + NACCQ + CTI) 
Model 3: Y ~ (WCTA + RETA + EBTA + SLTA) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (CLTA * CTI + CLTA 
* ZQ) + (PUB * NACCQ + PUB * CTI + LLTL *  ZQLAST) 
       
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 
Model3 <0.001 *** 
   
Panel B: Ohlson (1980)  
Model 1: Y ~ (SIZE + INTWO + OENEG + CHIN + FUTL ) 
Model 2: Y ~ (SIZE + INTWO + OENEG + CHIN + FUTL) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (ZQ + CLTA 
+ PUB + LLTL + NACCQ + CTI) 
Model 3: Y ~ (SIZE + INTWO + OENEG + CHIN + FUTL) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (CLTA * CTI 
+ CLTA * ZQ) + (PUB * NACCQ + PUB * CTI +   LLTL * ZQLAST) 
      
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 
Model3 <0.001 *** 
   
Panel C: Shumway (2001)  
Model 1: Y ~ (NITA + LTA)  
Model 2: Y ~ (NITA + LTA) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (ZQ + CLTA + PUB + LLTL + NACCQ + 
CTI) 
Model 3: Y ~ (NITA + LTA) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (CLTA * CTI + CLTA * ZQ) + (PUB * 
NACCQ + PUB * CTI + LLTL * ZQLAST) 
      
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 
Model3 <0.001 *** 
   
Panel D: Main model in this paper 
Model 1: Y ~ (NITA + LTA + CACL) 
Model 2: Y ~ (NITA + LTA + CACL) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (ZQ + CLTA + PUB + LLTL + 
NACCQ + CTI) 
Model 3: Y ~ (NITA + LTA + CACL) + (ASSETS + CPX + F2) + (CLTA * CTI + CLTA * ZQ) + 
(PUB * NACCQ + PUB * CTI + LLTL * ZQLAST) 
       
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 






Table 8: Public firm models: Comparisons of in-sample fit 
 
Public firm models are estimated with hazard model following Shumway (2001) using variables from 
respective model. The P-value of chi-square statistics are reported to estimate increase in in-sample fit of 
the model. The sample contains variables from the final sample of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms 
spanning 1980 to 2009. Observations used for each model is subject to availability of variables. 
Following Shumway (2001), all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level.  
 
Panel A: Altman (1968)  
Model 1: Y ~ (WCTA + RETA + EBTA + SLTA + LNAGE + METL) 
Model 2: Y ~ (WCTA + RETA + EBTA + SLTA + LNAGE + METL) + (ASSETS + CPX +FD) + 
(ZQ + CLTA + PUB + LLTL + NACCQ + CTI + DISP) 
Model 3: Y ~ (WCTA + RETA + EBTA + SLTA + LNAGE + METL) + (ASSETS + CPX + FD) + 
(CLTA * CTI + CLTA * ZQ) + (PUB * NACCQ + PUB * DISP + PUB * CTI + LLTL * ZQLAST) 
       
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 
Model3 <0.001 *** 
   
Panel B: Shumway (2001)  
Model 1: Y ~ (NITA + LTA + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA) 
Model 2: Y ~ (NITA + LTA + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA) + (ASSETS + CPX + FD) + (ZQ + 
CLTA + PUB + LLTL + NACCQ + CTI + DISP) 
Model 3: Y ~ (NITA + LTA + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA) + (ASSETS + CPX + FD) + (CLTA * 
CTI + CLTA * ZQ) + (PUB * NACCQ + PUB * DISP + PUB * CTI + LLTL * ZQLAST) 
       
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 
Model3 <0.001 *** 
   
Panel C: Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
Model 1: Y ~ (NITA + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA + F + LOGMVE) 
Model 2: Y ~ (NITA + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA + F + LOGMVE) + (ASSETS + CPX + FD) + 
(ZQ + CLTA + PUB + LLTL + NACCQ + CTI + DISP) 
Model 3: Y ~ (NITA + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA + F + LOGMVE) + (ASSETS + CPX + FD) + 
(CLTA * CTI + CLTA * ZQ) + (PUB * NACCQ + PUB * DISP + PUB * CTI + LLTL * ZQLAST) 
       
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 
Model3 <0.001 *** 
   
Panel D: Main model in this paper 
Model 1: Y ~ (ROA + LTA + CACL + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA + LOGMVE + B/M) 
Model 2: Y ~ (ROA + LTA + CACL + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA + LOGMVE + B/M) + (ASSETS 
+ CPX + FD) + (ZQ + CLTA + PUB + LLTL + NACCQ + CTI + DISP) 
Model 3: Y ~ (ROA + LTA + CACL + RSIZ + EXRET + LSIGMA + LOGMVE + B/M) + (ASSETS 
+ CPX + FD) + (CLTA * CTI + CLTA * ZQ) + (PUB * NACCQ + PUB * DISP + PUB * CTI + 
LLTL * ZQLAST) 
       
Chi-square P-value of residual deviance 
Model2 <0.001 *** 





Table 9: Private firm models: Forecasting accuracy comparison table 
 
This table presents forecasting accuracy of private firm bankruptcy prediction models estimated with data 
from 1980-2004. Yearly observation intervals is used to forecast bankruptcy probabilities for 2005 to 
2009. Each year, the probabilities are calculated and then the companies are grouped into deciles based 
on the probability of bankruptcy. The number of bankruptcies in each decile for each year are aggregated 
over 2005 to 2009 and reported in the below panels.  
 
Panel A: Altman (1968)    
Panel B: 
Ohlson (1980)       
Decile Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Decile Model 1 Model 2 
Model 
3 
         
1 29.7% 43.2% 48.6%  1 46.7% 57.3% 59.0% 
2 41.4% 71.6% 75.2%  2 59.9% 79.3% 80.2% 
3 52.3% 82.9% 85.1%  3 71.4% 87.2% 85.9% 
4 59.9% 91.0% 92.3%  4 82.8% 92.1% 92.5% 
5 69.4% 95.5% 95.5%  5 91.2% 96.5% 96.0% 
6 78.4% 97.3% 97.3%  6 92.5% 96.9% 96.9% 
7 82.9% 98.2% 98.2%  7 93.8% 98.2% 98.2% 
8 87.8% 99.1% 99.1%  8 94.3% 98.7% 98.2% 
9 91.9% 99.1% 99.1%  9 98.7% 99.1% 99.1% 
10 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  10 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
         
Panel C: 
Shumway (2001)        
Panel D: 
Main hazard 
model       
Decile Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Decile Model 1 Model 2 
Model 
3 
         
1 29.5% 41.4% 47.6%  1 31.7% 44.9% 48.0% 
2 66.5% 74.0% 76.7%  2 49.8% 78.4% 80.6% 
3 85.5% 88.1% 89.4%  3 62.1% 88.5% 88.5% 
4 93.4% 93.0% 93.8%  4 74.4% 94.3% 95.2% 
5 96.5% 96.5% 96.0%  5 80.6% 96.0% 96.5% 
6 96.5% 96.9% 97.4%  6 87.7% 97.4% 97.4% 
7 97.8% 98.2% 98.2%  7 95.2% 98.7% 97.8% 
8 98.2% 99.1% 99.1%  8 96.9% 98.7% 98.7% 
9 99.1% 99.1% 99.1%  9 98.2% 99.1% 99.1% 
10 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  10 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Model specifications: Table 9   
Model 1: Default model without creditor coordination effects 
Model 2: Default model appended by creditor coordination effects without interaction terms 






Table 10: Public firm models: Forecasting accuracy comparison table 
 
This table presents forecasting accuracy of public firm bankruptcy prediction models estimated with data 
from 1980-2004. Yearly observation intervals is used to forecast bankruptcy probabilities for 2005 to 
2009. Each year, the probabilities are calculated and then the companies are grouped into deciles based 
on the probability of bankruptcy. The number of bankruptcies in each decile for each year are aggregated 
over 2005 to 2009 and reported in the below panel.  
 
Panel A: Altman (1968)    
Panel B: 
Shumway 
(2001)       
Decile Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Decile Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
         
1 61.7 62.5 63.1  1 71.7 72.4 74.5 
2 80.5 81.1 82.4  2 87.4 89.0 89.5 
3 85.9 86.7 86.9  3 92.1 92.1 92.9 
4 88.3 92.2 92.2  4 95.3 96.1 96.1 
5 90.6 96.9 98.4  5 96.1 97.6 98.4 
6 92.2 98.4 99.2  6 96.1 99.2 99.2 
7 95.3 99.2 99.2  7 99.2 99.2 99.2 
8 96.9 99.2 100.0  8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
9 99.2 100.0 100.0  9 100.0 100.0 100.0 
10 100.0 100.0 100.0  10    
         
Panel C: Bharath 




model       
Decile Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Decile Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
         
1 78.0 79.4 79.4  1 71.9 73.4 78.6 
2 89.0 90.1 91.4  2 88.3 89.1 90.2 
3 93.7 93.7 93.7  3 91.4 92.7 92.7 
4 95.3 97.6 97.6  4 93.0 93.8 95.1 
5 98.4 98.4 98.4  5 95.3 97.4 98.3 
6 98.4 99.2 99.2  6 96.9 99.4 99.4 
7 99.2 99.2 99.2  7 98.4 99.4 99.4 
8 100.0 100.0 100.0  8 98.4 100.0 100.0 
9 100.0 100.0 100.0  9 98.4 100.0 100.0 
10 100.0 100.0 100.0  10 99.2 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Model specifications: Table 10   
Model 1: Default model without creditor coordination effects 
Model 2: Default model appended by creditor coordination effects without interaction terms 







Figure 1: Bankruptcy rate by industry 
 
This chart plots percentage of bankrupt firms in my final sample by industry following broader 
industry classification in Chava and Jarrow (2004) based on SIC Codes. All industries are represented 






Figure 2: Bankruptcy rate by year 
 
This chart plots percentage of bankrupt firms based on final sample in this paper by calendar year 









Figure 3: Final sample composition: Private vs. public in equity and debt 
 
This chart plots percentage of firms in my sample that are private vs. public in equity and debt.  






Figures 4-9: Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) plots for key 
variables 
 
Figures 4 to 9 present cumulative distribution functions of respective variables used in my analyses. The 
distribution of each variable for the bankrupt year is represented as the thick line. Thin line represents the 
distribution of each variable for non-bankrupt years. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 





Figures 10-15: Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) plots for key 
variables 
 
Figures 10 to 15 present cumulative distribution functions of respective variables used in my analyses. 
The distribution of each variable for the bankrupt year is represented as the thick line. Thin line 
represents the distribution of each variable for non-bankrupt years. All variables are winsorized at 1% 





Figures 16-21: Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) plots for key 
variables 
 
Figures 16 to 21 present cumulative distribution functions of respective variables used in my analyses. 
The distribution of each variable for the bankrupt year is represented as the thick line. Thin line 
represents the distribution of each variable for non-bankrupt years. All variables are winsorized at 1% 





Figures 22-25: Private firm models: Comparison of forecasting accuracy - area 
under ROC curve 
 
These plots present forecasting accuracy measured by area under ROC (Receiver Operating 
Characteristic) curve estimated based on variables from four different bankruptcy prediction models. The 
area under ROC curve is a widely used measure of the out-of-sample accuracy of forecasting models 
(Sobehart, Keenan, and Stein, 2000). A value of 0.5 indicates a random model with no predictive ability, 
whereas a value of 1.0 perfect discrimination. Thin line represents models (Model 1) estimated based on 
original variables without analyst forecast dispersion, accruals, or creditor coordination variables. Thick 
line represents models (Model 3) based on original variables with analyst forecast dispersion, accruals, 






Figures 26-29: Public firm models: Comparison of forecasting accuracy - area 
under ROC curve 
 
These plots present forecasting accuracy measured by area under ROC (Receiver Operating 
Characteristic) curve estimated based on variables from four different bankruptcy prediction models. The 
area under ROC curve is a widely used measure of the out-of-sample accuracy of forecasting models 
(Sobehart, Keenan, and Stein, 2000). A value of 0.5 indicates a random model with no predictive ability, 
whereas a value of 1.0 perfect discrimination. Thin line represents models (Model 1) estimated based on 
original variables without analyst forecast dispersion, accruals, or creditor coordination variables. Thick 
line represents models (Model 3) based on original variables with analyst forecast dispersion, accruals, 
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
 
Variables Definitions 
ROA  / NITA Net income / Total assets 
TLTA / LTA Total liabilities / Total assets 
CACL Current assets / Current liabilities 
RSIZ   Log (firm’s market capitalization / Total market cap of 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) 
EXRET Excess annual return over the value-weighted NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ return 
LSIGMA Standard deviation (residual return from a regression of 
twelve monthly returns of the firm on monthly returns of the 
market index) 
CPX Capital expenditure / Total assets 
ASSETS Log (total assets (book value)) 
FD Log (total liabilities (book value)) 
LOGMVE Log (Market value of equity) 
B/M Book value of equity / Market value of equity 
CLTA (Current liabilities-Cash or cash equivalents-Available 
revolving credit facility) / Total assets 
CTI Quintile of Creditor Transparency Index (CTI), calculated 
as: 
CTI = Median annual trading volume of public equity 
securities + Median annual trading volume of public debt 
securities +  Maximum annual trading volume of syndicated 
loan securities 
[Alternative] CTI = 1 (public debt outstanding)+1(public 
equity outstanding)+α*1(syndicated loan outstanding, 
where α is a relative transparency of syndicated loan market 
measured by relative trading volume with trading volume of 
2000 as 1). For 2000-2009, α  is 1. 
(1: indicator variable) 
ZQ Quintile of Z-score measured according to private firm 
model of Zmijewski (1984) 
ZQLAST Indicator variable of 1 if Z-score quintile is the highest, 
representing lowest credit quality measured by Z-score 
based on Zmijewski (1984)’s private firm model 
PUB Indicator variable of 1 if public debt is outstanding, and 0 
otherwise 
NACCQ Decile of accounting quality measured as higher decile 
representing lower operating accruals (or  more negative 
operating accruals) as measured in Sloan (1996) 
DISP Standard deviation (equity analyst 1-year earnings forecast) 
/ Median (equity analyst 1-year earnings forecast) 
LLTL Long term liabilities / Total liabilities 




RETA  Retained earnings / Total assets 
EBTA Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets 
SLTA Sales / Total assets 
SIZE Log (Total assets / GNP price index) 
INTWO Indicator variable of 1 if net income was negative for the 
last two years, 0 otherwise 
OENEG Indicator variable of 1 if total liabilities exceeds total assets, 
zero otherwise 
CHIN (Nit – Nit-1) / (|Nit |+ |Nit-1|), where NI is net income 
FUTL Funds provided by operations divided by total liabilities as 
measured in Begley, Ming and Watts (1996) 
F Face value of debt as measured in Bharath and Shumway 
(2008)  
LNAGE Log (equity trading age of the firm) 
METL Market value of equity / Total liabilities 
 
